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Abstract:
This paper argues that the parameters of monetary policy rules affect the persistence of
inflation and output.  Persistence is lower if monetary policy emphasises the price level or if
there is an inflation target. A greater emphasis on output increases persistence.  There is a
simple New Keynesian interpretation of our findings: monetary policy rules affect persistence
by affecting real rigidities.
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21) Introduction
Monetary policy rules have been widely used in recent years to
describe the behaviour of policymakers (eg Taylor, 1993, Clarida et al, 1999)
and to analyse optimal policy (Svennson, 1997).  This paper develops that
literature by arguing that monetary policy rules affect the persistence of
inflation and output and that they do so by affecting real rigidities.
We consider a simple macroeconomic model in which policymakers
manipulate aggregate demand using a monetary policy rule in which the
nominal money supply responds to the deviations of output and the price level
from their target or desired values.  On the supply side, monopolistically
competitive firms produce output using labour inputs.  Price adjustment is
staggered and modelled using the familiar Calvo (1983) framework.
We show that the parameters of the monetary policy rule affect the
persistence of inflation and output.  Persistence is lower if policymakers attach
greater importance to the price level.  If policymakers have a strict inflation
target, there is no persistence. By contrast, persistence is high if policymakers
give priority to attaining their target level of output.  Our model has the New
Keynesian property that persistence is higher when real rigidities are stronger
(Ball and Romer, 1990).  We argue that the parameters of monetary policy
rules affect persistence by affecting the degree of real rigidity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines
our model.  Section 3 describes how monetary policy rules affect persistence.
Section 4 summarises and considers the wider implications of our work.
2) The model
There are a large number of identical monopolistically competitive firms
Each firm has the simple production function
(1) it ity l=
where ity  is output in firm i at time t, itl  is employment in firm i at time t and all
variables are expressed as natural logarithms.   Each firm also faces the
demand curve
3(2) ( )it t it ty y p pη= − −
where ty  is aggregate demand, itp  is the price set by firm i, tp  is the
aggregate price level and η  is the constant price elasticity of demand.
Firms hire labour on the labour market.  We assume the labour market
is imperfectly competitive and that the real wage is
(3)  /t t tw p y ρ− =
where w is the nominal wage.  Equation (3) is a general expression for the
real wage that can be derived from a number of models of imperfectly
competitive wage determination such as efficiency wage theories or union-
firms bargaining models.  A larger value of ρ implies that real wages are less
responsive to output.
The optimal price for each firm is simply a mark-up over the nominal
wage.  Using (3), the optimal price is therefore
(4)  * /it t tp p yµ ρ= + +
where p* is the optimal price and µ=(η/η-1) is the mark-up of price over
marginal cost.
Aggregate demand is
(5) ( )t t t ty m p ε= − +
where m is the nominal money supply and tε  is an aggregate demand shock
that is assumed for simplicity to be white noise and known at time t.  Monetary
policymakers manipulate aggregate demand using the monetary policy rule
(6) ( ) ( )T Tt t tm m p p y yφ ψ= − − − −
4where pT is the target or desired price level and yT is the target or desired
level of output.  The parameters φ and ψ reflect the importance policymakers
attach to achieving their price and output targets.  If φ→∞ and ψ→0, the over-
riding priority of policymakers is to achieve a price level of pT.  In this model,
this is equivalent to a policy of strict inflation targeting (Bernanke et al, 1999).
If ψ→∞ and φ→0, the only objective of monetary policy is to achieve an output
level of yT.  If φ=ψ, policymakers pursue a target for nominal GDP, while if
φ=ψ=0, policymakers target the money supply.
Combining (4), (5) and (6), we can express the optimal price as
(7)  ˆ* (1 )
1it t t
p m p βµ β β εφ= + + − + +
where ˆ
1
T Tm p ym φ ψφ
+ +
=
+
 and 1
(1 )
φβ
ρ ψ
+
=
+
.
We assume that price adjustment is sluggish and use a version of the
Calvo (1983) model of staggered price adjustment.  For each firm, prices are
adjusted with fixed probability λ and remain constant with probability (1-λ).
Then the price level is given by
(8) 1
0
(1 ) (1 )iit it j it it
i
p x x pλ λ λ λ
∞
− −
=
= − = + −∑
where p is the aggregate price level, x is the price chosen by firms, The price
chosen when firms adjust is forward-looking:
(9) 1
0
(1 ) * * (1 )iit t it j it t it
i
x E p p E xλ λ λ λ
∞
+ +
=
= − = + −∑
where we assume there is no discounting for simplicity.
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5Combining equations (8) and (9) and aggregating, the aggregate price
level is
(10)
2
1 12 2
(1 ) ( ) *
2(1 ) 2(1 )t t t t t
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−
= + +
− + − +
Aggregating (7) and substituting into (10)
(11) 1 1 ˆ( ) (1 2 )( )1
t
t t t tp A p E p A m
εµ
β φ− += + + − + + +
where 2
1
2(1 )
A λλ βλ
−
=
− +
.  Solving this difference equation, prices can be
expressed as
(12) 1 ˆ(1 )( )1
t
t tp p m
εµθ θ β φ−= + − + + +
where
(13) 2 1B Bθ = − − ;
2
1
2(1 )
B βλ λ= + − .
From equation (13) and the definition of β we obtain
 (14)
2
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β
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d
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β
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Based on equation (12) inflation is then simply
(15)  1 1
1 ( )
1t t t t
θ
π θπ ε εφ− −
−
= + −
+
6where 1t t tp pπ −= −  is the inflation rate.  Substituting (12) and (6) into (5), we
can also express output as
(16) 1 1(1 ) ( )1t t t t
y y θθ θ ρµ ε ε
ψ− −
= − − + −
+
Equations (15) and (16) establish our main result, which is that the
parameters of the monetary policy rule affect the persistence of inflation and
output.  If policymakers place greater emphasis on the price level, then φ is
large and ψ is small.  From (7) (13), and (14) this implies that β will be higher
and so inflation and output will be less persistent.  A similar argument shows
that a greater emphasis on output creates more persistence.  If policymakers
have a strict inflation target there is no persistence (θ→0) and prices are at
their target level (p→pT).
We can give our findings a simple New-Keynesian interpretation.
Nominal rigidity is measured by (1-λ), the proportion of firms who do not
adjust price, and real rigidity is measured by (1-β), the impact of the
aggregate price level on each firms’ optimal price (Romer, 2001).   From (14),
we note that persistence is greater when nominal rigidity is stronger,
(1 ) 0
d
d
θ
λ− > , and this effect is stronger with stronger rigidities, 
2
(1 ) (1 ) 0
d
d d
θ
λ β− − > .
Our model therefore has the New Keynesian property that persistence is due
to nominal rigidity and that the impact of nominal rigidity is greater where real
rigidity is stronger (Ball and Romer, 1990).
From (7), we note that real rigidity is lower when real wages are more
responsive to output.  Therefore persistence is stronger when real wages are
less responsive to output (Ball and Romer, 1990).  But real rigidity is also
affected by the parameters of the monetary policy rule.  If policymakers
emphasize the price level, or adopt an inflation target, then, from (7), φ is large
relative to ψ, so β is large.  This means that real rigidity is low and, from (13),
there is less persistence in inflation and output.  Intuitively, policymakers will
respond to shocks that tend to move prices away from their target value by
offsetting changes in the nominal money supply.  Desired relative prices in (7)
7are therefore less responsive to the aggregate price level.  By contrast, if
policymakers place greater emphasis on output, then β is small.  Real rigidity
is stronger, leading to greater persistence.  In this case, monetary policy will
tend to accommodate movements in the price level and so desired relative
prices are more responsive to the aggregate price level.
4) Conclusions
This paper has argued that the parameters of monetary policy rules
affect the persistence of output and inflation and that a greater emphasis on
stabilising prices (for example, through an inflation target) reduces the
persistence of inflation and output.  We also argue that monetary policy rules
affect persistence by affecting the degree of real rigidity.
Our analysis can be extended in a number of ways.  We could consider
a more complete model where aggregate demand depended on the real
interest rate and where policymakers control the nominal interest rate, in
which case we could model monetary policy using a Taylor rule (Taylor,
1993).  We could consider a more detailed model of nominal rigidity, such as
the staggered adjustment model of Taylor (1979), in which case the frequency
of price adjustment may also be affected by the monetary policy rule. We
could also analyse a more detailed model of the labour market, allowing wage
setting to be influenced by the monetary policy rule.  We would expect to find
a similar link between monetary policy rules and persistence in these more
sophisticated models.
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